In this article, we study a discounted stochastic game to model resource optimal intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks. To address the problem of uncertainties in various network parameters, we propose a globalized robust game theoretic framework for discounted robust stochastic games. A robust solution to the considered problem is an optimal point that is feasible for all realizations of data from a given uncertainty set. To allow a controlled violation of the constraints when the parameters move out of the uncertainty set, the concept of globalized robust framework comes into view. In this article, we formulate a globalized robust counterpart for the discounted stochastic game under consideration. With the help of globalized robust optimization, a concept of globalized robust Markov perfect equilibrium is introduced. The existence of such an equilibrium is shown for a discounted stochastic game when the number of actions of the players is finite. The contraction mapping theorem, Kakutani fixed point theorem and the concept of equicontinuity are used to prove the existence result. To compute a globalized robust Markov perfect equilibrium for the considered discounted stochastic game, a tractable representation of the proposed globalized robust counterpart is also provided. Using the derived tractable representation, we formulate a globalized robust intrusion detection system for wireless sensor networks.
Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) are increasingly being applied for various commercial and industrial applications. They are also being used by defense forces to sense the presence of an enemy, to gauge explosives by measuring pressure and sound, for infrared imaging, etc.
The WSN nodes can gather sensory information, store and process data, and communicate with other nodes. This makes such networks even more useful in adverse environments. Therefore, the security of WSNs is becoming an important issue. However, their unmanned sensor nodes are prone to many attacks like jamming, black hole attack, denial of service, etc. Furthermore, these nodes have limited resources regarding computation, memory and low power, due to which securing WSNs becomes a difficult task.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have emerged as a resilient solution in achieving network security. They monitor network traffic, collect data, analyze the traffic and raise an alarm when they detect any suspicious activity. For a wireless sensor network, the function of IDS is to scan the communication channels to identify malicious nodes. But the low computational power and limited memory make it difficult for the IDS to store and analyze the network traffic. Also, limited bandwidth does not allow the IDS to scan all the channels at all times. Another problem comes from the uncertainty in various network parameters, which creates problems in decision making.
In order to achieve high level of security, the IDS deploys all its available resources, thereby increasing its resource cost. This cost can be managed if the IDS performs full-scale detection only when the network is more likely to be attacked, and performs limited functions otherwise. This gives rise to the game theoretic nature of the problem, where the IDS tries to strike a balance between its resource costs and detection rate. A game of optimal resource allocation is played between the IDS and the attacker. The IDS tries to minimize its cost and increase detection rate, whereas the attacker tries to compromise more and more nodes, and stay undetected.
Literature on game theoretic view of intrusion detection
Game theory has been applied to solve many network security issues for various reasons. Alpcan et al. [3] proposed a game-theoretic framework for a network of IDS sensors and considered an N person game in which coalitions of a subset of N players are formed. For non-cooperative environments, they model the attacker's behaviour, intent, and target with a two-player incomplete information game between IDS and attacker. Similar non-cooperative games were proposed by Han et al. [9] and Subba et al. [18] . Given the cost of raising the alarm, cost of attacking and benefit from attack, a Nash equilibrium can be obtained for such games.
Game theory has also been used to identify malicious internal users in ad-hoc networks [1] . Yu et al. [20] introduced secure routing and packet forwarding games to model the network, nodes, and routing mechanisms in the presence of adversary. For example, malicious nodes may not forward packets of other nodes, which is an essential requirement in cooperative networks. Their objective can be as simple as selfishly minimizing their effort and resource usage or as damaging as launching a passive denial of service (DoS) attack as studied by Agah et al. [2] . Patil et al. [15] proposed a game theory based approach to prevent DoS attacks in WSNs.
Limited energy/computation capability of sensor nodes is a challenge in applying game theory to network security. All intrusion detection techniques are energy intensive and reduce the overall lifetime of network [18] . Several articles (Han et al. [9] , Wang et al. [19] ) incorporated the node energy consumption in their models. Guan et al. [11] proposed a multi criteria game which includes energy consumption as one of its objectives.
Subba et al. [18] presented a multi layered framework to identify intrusion detection at different levels, viz. sensor level, cluster head level and base station level. It also employed Shapley Value and Vickery-Clark-Grooves mechanism to enforce cooperation and discourage malicious behavior by the monitoring nodes.
Fung et al. [8] examined the problems associated with collaborative intrusion detection systems. They have considered a Bayesian framework for modeling feedback aggregation wherein the IDS evaluates the feedback from neighbouring IDSs according to their history and opinions from the community. The Bayesian approach is used to model the false alarms and accurate detection rate of every IDS. They equipped their collaborative IDS with trust and resource management schemes.
Numerous studies have been done to analyze the uncertainties inherent in most of the realworld security scenarios. Yu et al. [20] considered an incomplete and imperfect game between the malicious and benign nodes. The nodes may drop or forward packets erroneously and also cannot be sure of observing other node's actions with precision. Therefore, the authors give a probabilistic analysis to model the uncertainty in action execution and observation. Under these conditions, they proposed optimal strategies for the benign nodes to secure their communication from the malicious nodes, forming a Nash equilibrium.
Moosavi et al. [14] formulated the intrusion detection problem as a stochastic game to capture the changing scenarios for both the attacker and IDS in a WSN. The WSN nodes are uncertain of the actions of other node's as well as at which state they are at. So, they considered a stochastic game-theoretic framework with incomplete information for modeling intrusion detection in WSN. They have used the concept of Markov perfect equilibria to achieve equilibrium in strategies. They have handled the uncertainty arising from detection rate and resulting uncertainty in transition probability using polytopic robust optimization techniques. A multilinear system has been given in [14] to characterize the equilibria in such conditions.
Motivation
In [14] , the authors gave a robust counterpart for the optimization problem of IDS in WSN to handle the parameter uncertainty. In this approach, the uncertain parameters take such a value which gives the worst case payoffs and the objective is to minimize the worst case payoff. In [14] , to obtain a robust equilibrium, it is assumed that uncertain parameters belong to a given uncertainty set and the constraints must be satisfied for all realizations of data from this set. In reality, this is a restrictive assumption since it depends heavily on the choice of uncertainty set. The assumption essentially ignores completely the possibility that the parameters may take values slightly outside the given uncertainty set. In this paper, we thus propose a globalized robust game-theoretic framework for intrusion detection to handle this assumption for data uncertainty.
Proposed study and organization of the paper
We model the uncertainty more realistically than that of [14] using Globalized Robust Counterpart (GRC) [4] of the cost functions. GRC relaxes the assumption in robust counterpart to some extent and allows controlled degradation of payoffs as the parameters take values outside the uncertainty set. We present the mathematical framework and its application to intrusion detection. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
The mathematical background and notations those are used in the paper are given in Section 2. With the help of globalized robust optimization, we propose a concept of globalized robust Markov perfect equilibrium in Section 3. In Section 4, we prove its existence through solving a formulated globalized robust counterpart for the considered discounted stochastic game. To identify a globalized robust Markov perfect equilibrium for the game under consideration, we derive a tractable representation of the GRC in Section 5. Section 6 applies the proposed gametheoretic framework to intrusion detection in WSNs by providing the characteristic payoff and transition probability functions. The conclusions and future works are discussed in Section 7.
Preliminaries
In this section, at first, we provide the set of all notations those are used throughout the paper. Next, the preliminaries to the considered problem-the concepts of Markov equilibrium, robust optimization and globalized robust optimization-are explored. Transition Probability t(s|s, a s ) transition probability from state s tos when a s is played t(s|s, △ s ) transition probability, when mixed strategy △ s is played t t(s|s, △ s ) s∈S,s∈S t min (s|s, a s ) minimum transition probability in the given set Z t t max (s|s, a s ) maximum transition probability in the given set Z t tr i (s|s, a s ) worst case transition probability from player i's perspective when a s is played tr i (s|s, △ s ) worst case transition probability from player i's perspective when mixed strategy △ s is played tr
Notations
tr i (s|s, △ s ) s∈S,s∈S z(s|s, a s ) elements of cone L, t 1 (s|j) − t(s|j) Z s [z(s|s, a s )]s ∈S,as∈As Matrices A s [A ij s ] 2ml n ×ml n B s [b ij s ] 2ml n ×ml n C s [C ij s ] l n ×ml n D s [d ij s ] l n ×ml n Norm A ∞ max(|a 1 |, |a 2 |, . . . , |a k |), where A = [a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k ] Component-wise inequality A B a i ≤ b i ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, where A = [a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a k ] and B = [b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b k ]
Markov equilibrium
We consider here an n person discounted stochastic game and discuss various equilibrium concepts. A stochastic game is a set of normal form games played in a sequence of stages [17] . Any single game depends upon the games played in the past and earlier choices made by the players. The discounted stochastic game that we consider in this paper is represented by:
We consider here Markov stationary strategies [6] in which the players' strategies depend only on current state and not on the time or previous states. This strategies mean that irrespective of the time, whenever a player reaches a state again, he will play with the same strategy as before. This property of stationary strategies makes the problem mathematically tractable [6] [13] .
The strategies of the player (△ i s ) are given by a probability distribution over the actions of the ith player in state s. Without loss of generality, we assume the same number of actions, l say, for each player in each state. So,
The current cost to a player, Ω i (s, a s ), is the cost to player i in state s when action tuple a s is played. When all the players play by mixed strategies, the cost to player i in state s is defined as
where
. Given all players play by mixed strategy △ −i s and i plays by the pure strategy a i s , the cost to player i in state s is given bŷ
The overall payoff/cost in a stochastic game can be either averaged or future discounted. Here we consider future discounted rewards since it allows the network administrator to control the significance of future cost. Future cost here refers to the cost to the players in the next state they reach. The players aim to minimize not only their current costs but also their discounted costs in future. They choose strategies in current state accordingly. This leads us to the following notion of equilibrium.
This means that △ is an optimal strategy if all the players, being rational, expect player i to play by the strategy which optimizes the objective function in (3) . If all the players in all states play by this strategy, then there is no incentive for unilateral deviation from strategy leading to equilibrium. In this formulation, the uncertainty in parameters is ignored and it thus is achieving a nominal solution.
Problem (3) can be expressed, equivalently, by:
). Every n-player general-sum discounted reward stochastic game has a Markov perfect equilibrium.
Robust optimization
Consider a general Linear Optimization Problem (LOP) of the form
where x, c ∈ R n , A is a matrix of order m × n, d ∈ R and b ∈ R m . In LOPs, some amount of uncertainty in data may be present in the parameters c, d, A, and b. The uncertainty may be due to errors in measurement, prediction, implementation, etc. The uncertain LOP can be represented as a set of LOPs with the parameters varying in some uncertainty set U . In order to deal with this uncertainty, a robust optimal solution to the problem (5) is obtained by solving (see [4] ) : min
There are two assumptions in this model:
(i) independent variables are assigned values as solution to problem before the actual parameters are revealed, and
(ii) the solution should satisfy all the constraints, for all possible realizations of uncertain parameters within the uncertainty set.
Globalized robust optimization
In real-world problems, often the uncertain parameters of the optimization model run out of the given uncertainty set. A feasible solution of the problem (6) is called a robust solution if it is optimal and, indeed, feasible for all realizations of data from the uncertainty set. But this is a restrictive assumption and depends heavily on the choice of uncertainty set. It completely ignores the cases where the parameters take values outside the assumed uncertainty set. Therefore, the concept of GRC comes into view. Here, controlled deterioration of the constraint is ensured when the parameter moves out of the uncertainty set.
Consider an uncertain constraint where the parameters c and d are perturbed by an amount λ ∈ Z,
where λ = [λ l ] l∈{1,2,...,k} and Z is the uncertainty set. Let Q be the set of all physically possible perturbations, such that Z ⊂ Q. GRC of this constraint is given by (see [4] ):
where α ≥ 0 is a global sensitivity parameter. As α is multiplied with the distance function dist(λ, Q), the higher the value of α, the higher the sensitivity of the perturbation. A small value of α signifies that violation of the restriction λ ∈ Z is less sensitive. In this way, α signifies a penalty parameter. For tractability of (8), it is assumed that Q can be expressed as Q = Z + L, where L is a closed convex cone. Also, the distance between λ and Q is given by
The solution of (6) when every uncertain constraint is replaced by its GRC is called a globalized robust optimal solution.
Globalized robust optimization in stochastic game
In this section, we formulate a globalized robust solution for an equilibrium in a discounted stochastic game (1) .
A robust solution of (1) is obtained when the objective function in the problem (4) is minimized subject to the constraints with the uncertain parameter taking any value from the uncertainty set. A robust counterpart for the problem (4) is given by the solution to the following problem: min
where Z t is the uncertainty set for t and t(s|s, △ s ) = as∈As t(s|s, a s )△ s (a s ). 
where t s = t(s|s, △ s ) s∈S . Also, since the mixed strategy is a probability distribution over the action space, 1 ′ △ i s = 1, △ i s ≥ 0, where 1 is the vector whose all components are 1's. The parameter α ≥ 0 is a given global sensitivity. The set Q represents the collection of all possible values for the transition probability t, i.e., Q = t(s|s, a s ) ∀s ∈ S, ∀s ∈ S, ∀a s ∈ A s : 0 ≤ t(s|s, a s ) ≤ 1, s∈S t(s|s, a s ) = 1 .
Existence of an equilibrium for globalized robust stochastic games
In this section, we prove the existence of an equilibrium solution for the GRC (10) of the discounted stochastic games (1) . We note that the problem (10) can be represented by:
We define the following functions ∀i ∈ N, ∀s ∈ S:
The function η △ is a contraction mapping on R nm with respect to the metric induced by the norm · ∞ in R nm .
Proof. See Appendix A.
Consider two strategy points △ s and △ ′ s and two game value points W i and X i . We define the points c = (△ s , W i ) and b = (△ ′ s , X i ), and the distance between them by
We now prove the equicontinuity of the set of functions g i s ∀i ∈ N, ∀s ∈ S. 
Proof. See Appendix B.
Theorem 4.2. For the problem (10) , let the uncertain transition probabilities t belong to a given compact set Z t ∈ R m 2 l n and payoffs are given by W ∈ R nm . It is given that controlled violation to this assumption, i.e., the uncertain parameters do not take values outside the given set Z t , is allowed for a globalized equilibrium. If the set of players N and their set of actions A are finite, then there exists an equilibrium point for the problem (10) .
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note 1. After the fact of existence of an equilibrium point for the problem (10), the question of its uniqueness may arise. However, it is hardly possible to confirm uniqueness for a general equilibrium problem like (10), where the convexity properties of Ω i (s, ∆ s ), t(s|S, ∆ s ) and Z t are not known. In particular, under the very restrictive conditions that the uncertainty set Z t is convex, Ω i (s, ∆ s ) is affine and t(s|S, ∆ s ) follows a uniform distribution, the objective function of the minimization problem (11) becomes strongly convex, and hence (10) will have a unique solution. One might attempt to find the answer of uniqueness by Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem. But it is a known fact that any sufficient condition for uniqueness of the fixed point in Kakutani's theorem is often infeasible or very restrictive (see [16] ).
Tractable representation of the GRC (10)
One can simplify the semi-infinite constraint in the problem (10) using the tractable representation of the GRC (see the subsection 2.4). However, before that one needs to precisely structure the closed convex cone L.
Structure of the cone L for interval uncertainty
We consider the case where detection probability and hence the transition probability belong to an interval. We define the uncertainty set Z t as Z t = t(s|s, a s ) ∀s ∈ S, ∀s ∈ S, ∀a s ∈ A s t min (s|s, a s ) ≤ t(s|s, a s ) ≤ t max (s|s, a s ), s∈S t(s|s, a s ) = 1 ,
where t min (s|s, a s ) ≥ 0 and t max (s|s, a s ) ≥ 0 are known parameters. In this section, we find a closed convex cone L such that Q = Z t + L. This cone is required to define the distance between t and Z t .
Note that both the sets Q and Z t are defined on the same space except the difference on upper and lower bounds on transition probability while the other constraints are same. Define
Sets Z t and Q Zt Q P Figure 1 : Uncertainty sets for transition probability where j represents the tuple (s, a s ), m is the number of states, l n represents the number of possible action tuples. Consider the sets
We observe that Z t and Q are sets in the space R m 2 l n and they are subsets of the set P . The sets Z t and Q are shown in Figure 1 for a two-dimensional case, where x 1 = t(1|1) and x 2 = t(2|1). The line segment from (1, 0) to (0, 1) represents the set Q and the smaller segment within it represents the set Z t . Towards searching an appropriate set L, so that Q = Z t +L, we attempt to obtain a one-one relation between the two sets Z t and Q. Geometrically, this can be interpreted as stretching the set Z t towards its outer set Q. This is represented in Figure 2 for a simple two-dimensional case.
We now apply a transformation to Z t and Q so that their centers are shifted to origin and the bounds to −1 and 1 as shown in Figure 3 . These transformed sets are
where t ′ (s|j) and t ′ 1 (s|j) are given by
As both the sets have been shifted to an identical set, by equating the corresponding points we obtain a one-one relation, given by:
Define a setL as the collection of the elements t 1 (s|j) − t(s|j). Let z(s|j) = t 1 (s|j) − t(s|j).
As
With the constraints obtained in (13) the setL can be visualized as shown in Figure 4 . As s∈S t(s|j) = 1 and s∈S t 1 (s|j) = 1, we get from z(s|j) = t 1 (s|j) − t(s|j) that
Therefore, the setL is given by, 
Note that the setL has the following properties.
• For any probability element λ > 0 from the probability space we observe that once z(s|j) ∈L, then λz(s|j) ∈L since
• For any pair of elements z 1 (s|j) and z 2 (s|j) ofL, trivially,
• Since s∈S z(s|j) = 0, being a hyperplane, is a closed set,L is a closed set.
Thus, L =L is the desired closed convex cone such that Q = Z t + L.
Obtaining tractable representation of GRC (10)
Using the tractable representation in the subsection 2.4 of the GRC over the semi-infinite constraint in the problem (10) we get the following pair of constraints
and s∈S,as∈As
where L is the cone that is derived in Subsection 5.1.
We now define a matrixZ i s = [W ī s △ i s (a s )]s ∈S,as∈As . The matrixZ i s can be represented bȳ Z i s =Ẑ i s △ i s , whereẐ i s ∈ R ml n ×l . The analysis of (15) proceeds as in [14] with its equivalent conditions being that ∃q i s ∈ R 2ml n and ∃r i s ∈ R l n such that
where the matrices A s and C s are [A ij s ] 2ml n ×ml n and [C ij s ] l n ×ml n , respectively. Here C s is a matrix of ones and zeroes which satisfies C s t s = 1, i.e., it ensures that given an action tuple in a state, the system will transition to either the same state or a different state. Also, y s ∈ R 2ml n and A s satisfy A s t s y s , which means the transition probability stays inside the given bounds.
The semi-infinite constraint in (16) can be simplified as follows:
The maximization problem on the left hand side of (17) is given by
Using the matrices, B s = [b ij s ] 2ml n ×ml n and D s = [d ij s ] l n ×ml n , the problem (18) can be written as, max
where Z s = [z(s|s, a s )]s ∈S,as∈As andZ i s = [W ī s △ s (a s )]s ∈S,as∈As .
The dual of (19) is
where u i s ∈ R 2ml n and v i s ∈ R l n are the dual variables of the problem (19) , andẐ s is defined byZ i s =Ẑ i s △ i s , whereẐ i s ∈ R ml n ×l .
By strong duality theorem [5] , (20) is bounded and feasible, and its optimal value is equal to that of (19) . Therefore, the constraint (17) can be represented by the condition that there exist u i s ∈ R 2ml n and v i s ∈ R l n such that
The strategy point △ is a globalized robust Markov perfect equilibrium point of the problem (11) if ∀i ∈ N, ∀s ∈ S, given (△ −i s , W i ), ∃u i s , q i s ∈ R 2ml n and ∃v i s , r i s ∈ R l n such that
is an optimal solution of the problem:
The dual of the problem (21) is given by
where tr i s ∈ R ml n is given by [tr i s (s|s, a s )]s ∈S,as∈As andΩ ′i (s, △ −i s ) ∈ R l n−1 ×l is given by (2) . It satisfies Ω i (s, △ s ) = 1 ′Ω′i (s, △ −i s )△ i s . This leads to the following theorem for finding the equilibrium of the problem (11).
Theorem 5.1. The strategy vector △ is a globalized robust Markov perfect equilibrium point with the robust value W i if and only if ∀i ∈ N, s ∈ S, ∃u i s , q i s ∈ R 2ml n and ∃v i s , r i s ∈ R l n such that (△, W i s , u i s , v i s , q i s , r i s , tr i s , Z s ) is a solution to the following non-linear system:
where tr i (s|s, △ s ) is the worst case transition probability as per each player's perspective and is given by tr i (s|s, △ s ) = as∈As tr i (s|s, a s )△ s (a s ).
The vector e ′ l ′ is the l ′ th unit column vector of dimension l. Proof. See Appendix D.
Globalized robust IDS for wireless sensor networks
We consider a WSN of n nodes and assume that (i) The nodes communicate with each other through wireless channels.
(ii) There is one attacker node present in the network whose aim is to compromise as many nodes as possible by sending malicious messages.
(iii) There is a distributed IDS running on all the sensor nodes which tries to defend the node from being infected or tries to recover an already infected node.
As the IDS cannot scan all the communication channels at all times, it resorts to channel scanning. It scans every channel a few times per second to intercept any suspicious activity. If it scans at a high rate, the chances of intercepting the attacker are more. But at the same time, this uses a lot of its communication bandwidth and other resources. If the IDS scans at a low rate, its resources cost is manageable and can be used for other purposes. However, if the attacker is highly active at this point, a lot of damage will be done undetected. Therefore, to solve this dilemma, the proposed game theoretic solution can be applied.
We model this scenario as a two-player non-zero sum discounted stochastic game between the IDS and attacker, where the number of infected nodes is taken as the state. Let the states belong to the set S = {1, 2, . . . , n}. If the system is in state s, it means there are s infected nodes currently. If another node gets infected by the attacker, the system moves to state s + 1, and if an infected node is recovered, the system moves to state s − 1. We attribute two actions to both attacker (Player 1) and IDS (Player 2), low and high rate of attacking and scanning, respectively.
Payoffs or costs
The cost to the IDS and attacker are modelled by a function which increases exponentially with number of infected nodes. This is relevant for cases where it is highly undesirable to have infected nodes in network. The functions modelling current cost of being in state s are given by: where c(s) is given by γ exp(δs − 1), for some positive γ and δ, and C i h , C i l are constant costs of playing high and low actions a i h , a i l , respectively, i = 1, 2. The cost function for the attacker is negative to indicate that it is actually his/her payoff as number of infected nodes increase.
Transition probability
We note that many of the above parameters in payoff/cost depend upon the properties of the particular WSN under consideration. For example, in military sensitive applications, the value of γ will be large. If the IDS is scanning at the same time an attack is being carried out, the chances of it being able to detect the malicious activity depend upon the rate of attack, and also the rate of scanning by the IDS. We define the probability of successful defense or recovery of node as in [14] , dp(a s ) = min 0.16 Dr a 2
where a s = {a 1 s , a 2 s } is the action tuple and Dr is the detection rate. The transition probabilities are defined as follows:
To obtain the globalized robust equilibrium for this two-player non-zero sum discounted stochastic game between the IDS and attacker, we put the definitions of payoff function and transition probability into the system of equations given in Theorem 5.1, and then solve it.
Conclusions and future scope
In this article, we have considered the problem of resource optimal intrusion detection in wireless sensor networks. We have proposed a game theoretic framework to minimize the resource cost of the IDS and at the same time protect the network from being infected. The security problem has been modelled as a discounted stochastic game between the IDS and attacker. To make the framework immune to uncertainty in data, we proposed a GRC of the stochastic game. The equilibrium solution of the game has been analyzed with the help of this GRC.
As per the proposed solution, the equilibrium strategies are formulated at a central server. Thereafter, the IDS scans accordingly in every state. However, the physical scenario may change and the cost functions may need to be readjusted. For example, if the average number of compromised nodes becomes too high or the channel scanning becomes more resource intensive, etc. Therefore, an updated mechanism is required which can automatically adjust the cost parameters based on physical performance. Also, the physical implementation of the proposed IDS in a wireless sensor network can be taken up in the future.
In this paper (Part I: Theory), we have given the theoretical results on formulating a globalized robust counterpart and its tractable representation to find a globalized robust Markov perfect equilibrium. As a continuation to this paper, in the next step (Part II: Simulation and Comparison) a complete details of the implementation and comparison with the existing models the will be given. The approach for the computation will be as follows.
For the nominal nonzero-sum discounted stochastic game (4), wherein the detection rate Dr is assumed to be fixed, the existence for equilibrium is a known result [21] . The nonlinear program given in [22] is used to find stationary equilibrium for nominal case. However, solving the robust case is a difficult task. The non-convex formulation given in Theorem 5.1 has multiple equilibrium points and non-unique equilibrium values. The robust approach attempts to find the best solution from the set of nearly optimal solutions-making it more difficult to solve.
Note that the uncertainty in detection rate Dr results in interval uncertainty in probability of defense dp(a s ) and consequently in transition probability t. Since this uncertainty is resolved after the players select their equilibrium strategies, the entire transition probability interval is valid. Therefore, for each state we need to calculate the interval in which the transition probability belongs to, i.e., the bounds t min and t max . Since t defined in our case is piece-wise linear for dp(a s ), the supremum occurs at the boundaries for Dr ∈ [D min , D max ], the interval of uncertainty.
With the instantaneous cost functions, discount factor and the bounds obtained above, we implemented in AMPL [23] the formulation in Theorem 5.1 for a small scale WSN comprising of 15 nodes (m = 15). Using KNITRO solver [24] , we found feasibile solution on NEOS server [25] under a minute. This yields equilibirum strategies W i s and worst case transition probability tr that each player expects from the uncertainity set. The code for the implementation is available at https://github.com/aks1996/GRC-IDS. For any clarification on implementation, readers are requested to contact the second author. The last inequality (B.4) follows from |̺ i s | < δ(ǫ) ≤ δ 2 (ǫ) and | j∈κ ρ j sa | ≤ |ρ j sa | < δ(ǫ) ≤ δ 3 (ǫ). Therefore, As | g i s (t s , △ s , W i )−g i s (t s , △ ′ s , X i ) |≤ ǫ for d t (c, b) < δ(ǫ), the set of functions g(t s , △ s , W i ), t s ∈ Q are equicontinuous.
It is proved in Theorem 4.1 that η △ (W ) is a contraction mapping. Using Banach Contraction Mapping Theorem, W is a unique fixed point for the function η. Therefore, we have
This means that ζ(△) = ∅. Now, Theorem 4 of [13] establishes that ζ(△) is convex, upper semi-continuous and closed for any △. As ζ completes the requirements of Kakutani's fixed point theorem [12] , it follows that ζ(△) has a fixed point which is also the equilibrium point.
